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ABSTRACT 
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have been in use for years in the United 
Kingdom, Europe, Australia and for a shorter time here in the United States. 
Typical PPP infrastructure projects include a multi-year term of operation in 
addition to constructing the structural features to be used. Early studies are 
proving PPP delivery methods to be effective at construction cost containment. 
This paper will examine why PPP's are effective during this critical construction 
period of the facilities life cycle. Most PPP's are grounded in a contractual 
framework called a Concession Agreement (CA). The CA defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the Concessionaire (the Private side) and the Owner (the Public 
side) including constraints of construction and operations of a facility for a set 
period of time. The Concessionaire normally will create an entity that serves as 
the legal form of company organization that holds the contract, responsibilities 
and risk as delineated by the CA, this entity is normally termed a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV).  The Concessionaire will typically engage an Engineer and 
Constructor to perform the engineering and construction of the facility. The SPV 
will be utilized as the Proponent to an Owner during an initial period of bidding 
by competing Concessionaires or SPVs on a best value basis that results in one 
Concessionaire or SPV selected to be the "preferred proponent". The preferred 
proponent will then proceed to fulfill a set of prescribed conditions including a 
refined cost, schedule, financing and operational plan that conforms to the 
intentions of the Owner. There is a significant cost to the creation, understanding 
and ultimate refinement of the CA and SPV such that it meets the intentions of the 
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Owner and is financeable as delineated by the available markets for finance. All 
of which are centered on some sort of negotiation.  An examination of the key 
elements that constitute the early stage negotiation reveal that there is room for 
negotiation created by the governing documentation while maintaining a 
competitive environment that brings the best value available to the Public entity.   
Studies are supporting the notion that these extensive discussions and elaborate 
agreements lead to better decisions being made by Owners, Concessionaires, 
Engineers and Builders that result in overall better constraint of cost through the 
construction phase of the projects examined. Prior to all of that activity a PPP 
should pass a Value for Money (VfM) examination. This is yet another feature of 
the PPP process that includes significant degrees of negotiation resulting from 
Private input.  It is the intent of this study to examine why the features and 
outcomes of more or less negotiation and the degree of rigor associated with it. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction to Public Private Partnership 
 
A Public Private Partnership (PPP) is an alternative delivery method to traditional 
means of delivery. For the purposes of this study the PPP context is within the 
space of delivering an engineered and constructed element in the built 
environment.  In short a PPP is termed an alternative delivery method in contrast 
to other methods of delivery. A PPP is typically configured as detailed in Figure 
1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Typical Basic PPP Organization Chart (Yescombe 1999) 
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It can be seen that a PPP goes well beyond the context of just the design 
engineering and construction required to build. The difference between a PPP and 
more traditional types of delivery is best seen in Figure 2 that details the way the 
alternatives function. 
 
 
Figure 2 Functional Difference Between Public and Private Parties to a PPP 
(Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
The differing roles between the Public and Private sides of the delivery system are 
at the heart of the matter that this study explores.  
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DBB v. PPP 
 
What follows is an examination of the reasons why one method of delivering a 
portion of the built environment will more effectively constrain the cost of 
construction over another.  In this study’s context the term “delivery method” is 
defined as the process of design, engineering and construction that results in a 
portion of the built environment to be left behind.  The portion of the built 
environment left behind can also be described as the scope of work. The scope of 
work left behind may be essentially the same regardless of the delivery method 
implemented to achieve that scope of work; however the processes utilized can 
vary in substantial ways.  A good analogy of this can be drawn for the production 
and use of a cubic yard of concrete.  As the concrete is being batched, it does not 
know where it will ultimately be placed in its final resting position.  It does not 
care. Nor necessarily do the people weighing the constituent ingredients, mixing 
them and delivering them.  Where the concrete eventually goes does not matter to 
them. They will take the same care with a batch of concrete that goes into the 
floor of a doghouse as they do as that yard of concrete that will go into the 
skyscraper next door.  If the as-yet not delivered concrete has been specified to 
yield an ultimate strength of 15,000 psi. There may be no difference in the basic 
procedures. Yet on a finite level there will be differences. The Specified level of 
strength for the high-rise and subsequently due to that level of assurance, there 
may be an additional cost.  The dog house floor builder may not care to have that 
documented. This same case can be made for the project delivery method as it in 
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many ways is similarly separate from the built project yet tied intimately to it.  
The project can be built via disparate methods to the same end effect. But it is in 
that finite level of scrutiny that the cost of construction can be affected as 
determined by the varying methods of delivery.   Over time as the procedures for 
the design engineering and construction process have evolved, the issue of how 
effective one method is over another has come under increasing scrutiny. 
The premise herein is that a Public Private Partnership best serves the Public 
interest when design engineering and constructing large and/or complex 
infrastructure projects as a part of the built environment. PPP is a common 
acronym, but the terms P3 and PFI will also be seen in documentation from 
different locations around the globe. Even the vernacular may vary when 
describing the delivery method. The effects under examination herein are 
common regardless of the acronym used as a descriptor of the method or where in 
the world it is taking place.  Within this paper the PPP delivery method is 
contrasted and compared to another more widely used and “traditional” 
engineering and construction delivery method known as Design, Bid, Build 
(DBB). Design Bid Build is commonly referred to by the acronym DBB.  The 
issue is not whether one delivery method is superior to the other in terms of 
construction cost containment, this has been proven many times, (Sanvido and 
Konschar 1999)  but why is that the case. There are those who still believe that 
DBB provides the best value (Beard, Loulakis and Wundram 2001).  This is a 
mistaken notion when the projects are very large (over US$100 million) and 
recent studies have proven this to be the case. Figure 3 portrays this graphically.  
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Figure 3 Caltrans % of Cost Overrun Profile v. Size of Project 
(Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
 Design Build (DB) provides better value (Warne 2005) (Shrestha 2006).  Most 
PPPs utilize DB as a featured component of their delivery. And more recently 
when examining the effectiveness of alternative project delivery systems PPP’s 
were found to be superior when compared to DBB and Design Build (DB) from 
purely a monetary examination of the completed construction phase (Chasey 
2012).  An excerpted graph from that study demonstrates this in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4 Large Highway Project Construction Cost and Schedule Overrun as 
a % of Original Budget (Chasey 2012) 
  
This study has only considered the constraint of construction cost to its 
completion within the PPP.  As the PPP moves through its phases or stages as the 
Australians have termed them, the construction stage is stage three of three 
(Infrastructure Partnerships Austrailia 2010). These were defined in that report as 
follows: 
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It is interesting to note that although the fact that PPP has been shown to constrain 
the cost of construction more effectively on large complex projects, much of the 
writing from the Public reviews of the PPP method claim that this is still an area 
of uncertainty (CBO 2012) (Taylor 2012). This is not the case – that question has 
been settled. Figure 5 is a summary chart reflecting the results of numerous 
studies and shows that on average the increase in cost containment is over 10%, 
the arrows point out the difference that the studies reveal.  
 
Figure 5 Large Highway Project Construction Cost and Schedule Overrun as 
a % of Original Budget-Global Results  
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time the construction phase of the work is contracted for than any other delivery 
method in use. 
 
While most studies to date focus on the contrasts between and “why” one delivery 
method works better or more appropriately than the other, this is a different why 
than the why the PPP method is working to constrain construction costs. This is 
distinct from the “why” a PPP or DBB should be used.  That is a different issue. 
The question answered herein is why a PPP is so effective at constraining the cost 
of construction. 
 
In these previously referenced studies, serving the Public interest is measured 
principally in monetary terms.  In essence the total cost to construct that portion 
of the built infrastructure environment is the focus of the measure.  This study is 
an examination of why the ability of one method of project deliverance, that being 
PPP, can deliver more efficacies in controlling the costs of construction.   This 
differs from the reason why an Owner would want to use one method or another.  
There are other factors to consider such as availability of funds, the legislative 
context at work, etc. when making the selection and these may come in to view 
while pursuing the question why the PPP is in fact more effective at construction 
cost containment but they are not the focus of the study.  
 
It is first important to define the boundaries of this examination via the 
identification of the constituents roles that are normally engaged in PPP’s and 
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DBB’s deliverances to make these projects happen as well as the basic structures 
or organization of the two types of project deliverance methods.  By 
understanding these roles and structures the differences may be drawn out and 
compared in a meaningful manner.  A view toward the historical context is of 
secondary importance although still key to understanding the whys of the PPP’s 
efficacy in constraining the construction costs of a project. And it is within this 
historical context that the examination starts. 
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Historical background 
 
Since the earliest days of humankind wandering the planet via footpaths that later 
turned into roads, these types of commonly used features of the built environment 
have been vital to survival and prosperity.  Some of the earliest endeavors have 
included huge investments of time, materials and other resources measured in 
terms of treasure and lives to affect Public works for the benefit of human kind. 
The extent to which they are funded and executed in their final locations has 
varied widely.  But the manner in which they are delivered has always been the 
subject of discussion, debate and sometimes controversy and worse, including 
conflict.  In North America these discussions, debates and conflicts have been 
happening since the beginning of the continents occupation as the newly arriving 
inhabitants pushed their way into largely un-inhabited places. As the novel 
formed governmental entities were founded and created, the subject of how to 
fund and build publically accessible infrastructure became the focus of debates 
between such luminaries as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.  That debate 
focused centrally on the subject of who could best serve the public interest, 
Private entities or Public entities.  This debate continues today although the issues 
swirling around the debate are generally more complex.  The results of these early 
North American debates and controversies were seen in the way projects were 
delivered much as they are today. Including the manner in which the built 
environment investments are funded.  Because the types of built environment 
have dramatically changed as there has been much written about that history, 
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there is no need to delve any deeper into the funding or history except to look at 
the more recent record as it relates to why the DBB method has been the major 
deliverance method in the modern post World War Two era.   
 
In the United States over the past sixty years, government legislation have 
supported the notion that competition is the best way to extract the lowest cost 
and most value from the construction industry when constructing Publicly funded 
infrastructure. A congressional study done in the fifties supported this notion and 
has endured in certain circles even today.  This notion extends to a perspective on 
the best means of exacting that competition for engineering design and 
construction.  This “traditional” or DBB process of engineering and constructing 
is intended to separate the design from the construction. The rational is that the 
engineering is a function that is separate from the construction process.  And that 
the process is consecutive.  The applied thought that forms the basis for the 
structural, mechanical, and electrical engineering are carefully considered from 
the conceptual through detailed design engineering phases of the engineering 
process and represent, in the end, what the end users of the facility want.  The 
manners in which these endeavors are carried out are slightly different between 
the engineering and construction.  There is a paradigm that is supported by a three 
party relationship between the Public as Owner, Engineer as technical facilitator 
and Contractor as Builder that is central to the sharing of risks, a division of 
specialist’s roles and what to date has been presumed to be the best way to bring 
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the highest level of value to the Public.  Figure 6 details the split of risk as it is 
generally applied in a DBB context. 
 
 
Figure 6 Typical Risk Split for DBB (Arup 2012) 
In this context the Owner and the Engineer were often found on the Public side 
and the Contractor or Builder was on the Private side.  There has been a shift 
away from the Public side carrying much of the load in terms of engineering from 
the Public to the Private side. Thus the risk profile shift is subtle yet significant 
ways when utilizing the PPP method as can be seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Typical Risk Split for PPP (Arup 2012) 
 
The studies that pointed to the DBB or traditional method of delivery had focused 
on the beginning of the construction process as the benchmark.  That is the time 
that engineering is presumed to be 100% complete and the construction cost has 
been set by a firmly bid and surety bond guaranteed contract that the scope of 
work envisioned will be delivered on time and on budget.  As it turns out this 
point of measuring value ignored the balance of the constructive process.  That is 
the front end work. Studies in recent years have demonstrated that this point of 
demarcation was missing the balance of effort time and cost associated with 
actually achieving the built environments end configuration. 
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paradigm has developed that includes a set of standard contracts supported by 
standard specifications and standard plans.  These do vary from state to state 
within the United States and from Province to Province within Canada but they 
have significant commonalities. The DBB method is further supported by a body 
of legislation, regulations, as well as legal precedent documented by the judicial 
system, that the wider community of practicing professionals understands.  This 
body of governing documentation includes guidance to not only the Engineers 
and Contractors, whom are the principal actors within the process, but the 
lawyers, bankers and a host of consultants that all serve to support the design and 
construction process.  
One of the major contentions of this writing concerning the whys is that this 
governing set of standard documents and contracts when utilized in everyday 
practice limits the degree to which the actors may communicate. And more 
specifically that this restriction in terms whereby there is no negotiation, hence 
communication, needlessly and expensively raises the ultimate cost of 
construction.  The difference in cost can be and has been documented.  In fact 
when considering large or complex portions of the built environment, the DBB 
method of delivery does push the cost of the constructed built environment above 
what it could be when delivered as a PPP.   
 
The monetized difference between the delivery types will be considered as a 
measure, although it is difficult to define exactly where the difference in cost may 
stem from, the inputs to the PPP method of delivery are examined and compared 
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to the DBB method.  Inputs considered include the additional level and degree of 
scrutiny that a PPP affords.  The consultative processes that are brought to bear on 
the PPP process as delegated to the Commercial, Legal, Technical, Insurance and 
Financial experts need examination.  Additionally, the considerable expense to 
pay for that expertise should also be understood.  The superior results being 
garnered from the PPP deliverance is a given, it is the why this occurs that is 
examined in each category of consultative expertise. 
 
Although the vast majority of work is delivered via the DBB method there are 
reasons that the PPP is regaining favor for certain types of work. Most 
interestingly it is the lingering effects of the 2008 -2012 recession that have 
prompted an increasing interest of the PPP delivery method. At least that is the 
common belief. But the use of the PPP method of delivery began well before the 
aforementioned recession.  This notion is considered closer by examination in the 
study as well.  There could be reason to believe that this method was imminent to 
be used in a wider sphere of geography and type of construction even without the 
acute financial pressures in the contemporary environment. The study will 
examine the notion that the increased use of PPP’s is due in part to a combination 
of recent fiscal challenges but more consistently the drive to perform more work 
faster, cheaper and better that has resulted in the movement on the Public side 
from DBB to PPP as a delivery method.  The migration to the PPP method to 
build a project is defined by the level of understanding that the decision makers 
have in regards to the costs and benefits. Costs and benefits are correctly 
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examined at the extrapolated end points in the constructive process, not the 
beginning. This paper examines the move from the traditional manner of 
deliverance in the form of DBB project delivery toward the PPP method simply to 
explain the reason why the PPP is so much more effective at constraining the cost 
of construction.  
There is certainly more than one measure of the value of one delivery type over 
another.  The monetary value often trumps the others.  The others; the value to 
society of an investment in the built environment measured in terms of increased 
efficiency in the use of any particular facility, the increase in overall value of a 
communities real estate, quality of life, safety in use, etc. are hard to capture and 
are beyond the scope of this study.  The focus is squarely on the cost of the 
completed work under examination at the completion of the construction stage. 
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The why of PPP effectiveness 
 
The central question posed then is: Why do PPP’s provide more value? The quick 
answer proposed is negotiation:  negotiation performed in a rigorous manner.    
But the simple reason why a PPP is superior in terms of stage three construction 
cost has not been documented.   It could be that the answers are not really simple, 
but in fact quite complex.  Much has been written concerning the results of 
completed PPP’s and DBB projects as it relates to lessons learned.  Over time 
these study efforts have led to various attempts to document best practices.  The 
why question in this study extends beyond the determination of best practices. 
Although best practices support the how questions – as in how to best utilize the 
delivery method, the how’s do not provide the deeper level understanding of the 
why PPPs are more effective at constricting capital expenditures beyond approved 
budgets (Morallos, et al. 2008).    
 
The reasons for this effectiveness can be tied to a variety of key aspects. Foremost 
among them is communication.  Communication between constituents parties is 
largely absent in the DBB setting.  The communication nuances in delivery 
methods are found in the contractual framework that each method is constrained 
or empowered by negotiation. The degree to which a project may be examined as 
it comes to fruition and solidifies as a contract document carried forward into the 
construction process is the essence of the notable differences of delivery methods.  
The communication via negotiation that is afforded by the PPP contractual 
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framework is generally embodied in the Concession Agreement (CA).  The term 
CA is used as a generic term to describe the agreement between a Public entity 
and proposers as respondents to a request for proposal (RFP).  The CA steers 
proposers to a particular form of organization that is designed to provide the most 
competitive response that additionally provides the best value to the Public entity.  
The communication via negotiation that occurs is facilitated by the contractual 
framework as this study will demonstrate. 
 
There are now a plethora of studies and reports that prove the effectiveness of 
PPP for large infrastructure projects yet what is lacking is the most fundamental 
assessment for why the PPP delivery method is effective (Bain 2010) 
(Infrastructure Partnerships Austrailia 2010).  In short this study compares the 
efficacy of negotiation and the communication that accompanies that negotiation, 
its rigor and impact upon the ultimate outcome of construction cost containment 
when endeavoring to bring maximum value to the Public while building large 
infrastructure projects in North America. 
 
In large part understanding the effectiveness of the PPP delivery methods seems 
to be a very complex undertaking, when in fact the concepts are simple.  
Government is slow to accept the deluge of factual data that is available.  This 
slow rate of acceptance is found within the governmentally produced reports 
(CBO 2012) (Taylor 2012).  This is likely because there are political pressures at 
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work and because our US centric views of the experiences from other countries as 
difficult to internalize. That topic is left to another set of writing. 
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CHAPTER 2 Background Literature 
 
A very large body of work has been produced as a result of projects studied that 
serves to underscore the notion that by simply providing the opportunity to  
candidly vet the important issues that can ultimately cause a project to exceed its 
expected budget projects may yield better outcomes in terms of their construction 
cost containment. Part of that body of work has been drawn on to identify that 
assertion and is included in the reference list herein – and there is much, much 
more available than this list details. 
 
The issue of construction cost overrun seems to have been brought to light in a 
contemporary and substantial way in 1997 via a report to the United States Senate 
by the General Accounting Office of the United States that found the reasons for 
large project overruns could not be ascertained because the cost data was not even 
clearly available of evident.  And five years later a study covering the previous 20 
years of large projects found the cause was termed “Optimism Bias” to be the 
case in the United Kingdom as well. As defined in that report “Optimism bias is 
the tendency for a project’s costs and duration to be underestimated and/or 
benefits to be overestimated.  It is expressed as the percentage difference between 
the estimate at appraisal and the final outturn” (Mott McDonald 2002).  
Bent Flyvbjerg most notably called the issue to the attention of policy makers 
when he reported that roads suffer an average cost escalation of 20.4% of their 
original budgeted cost (Flyvbjerg 2003).  The results were worse for more 
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complex construction efforts with fixed links (including tunnels and bridges) of 
33.8% with rail projects worst of all infrastructure elements studies at 44.7%.  In 
addition to pointing out that overruns of construction cost are significant across 
the infrastructure spectrum, the other important lesson learned is that project type 
matters. Figure 8 provides a glimpse of the variety of delivery methods from the 
view of the federal government. 
 
Figure 8 Spectrum of PPP Responsibilities Public to Private (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Austrailia 2010)  
 
Thus when studying the effects of a project delivery type it is important to 
segregate the project type. Conclusive recommendations are rightly segregated by 
the size, degree of complexity and a number of other very specific issues around 
any particular projects set of circumstances.  Flyvbjerg goes on to postulate the 
reasons for the overruns and concludes that it is attributable to “Optimism Bias”.  
Flyvbjerg and others have asserted that in some cases the early stage under-
estimating is due to simply lying (Flyvbjerg 2002).  This is a fanciful conspiracy 
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theory that points toward a communicative issue to wit, a lack thereof, in a 
transparent manner.  It lends entirely too much credence to the notion that great 
minds are thinking of ways to fool the Public when in fact the contractual 
framework negates and clouds effective transparent and honest communication.  
Coining a new term such as “Optimism Bias” is a good move toward 
understanding the whys simply because the term represents the up-front efforts or 
lack thereof that go into selection of the right means of project delivery.  And 
reaching further Flyvbjerg seeks to proscribe the means with which that early 
work is done properly. 
The collected literature shows a progression of the state of awareness regarding 
the cause and effect relationship between the type of project delivery method and 
the importance of selecting the right type of delivery for different projects and 
their degree of complexity and size.  From an early study (Wiss 1997) wherein the 
new methods of procurement are evolving toward Design Build Operate to the 
more recent results oriented studies of completed PPP’s (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Austrailia 2010).  A study of the Presidio Parkway (examined as a 
case study later in this thesis) conducted by two Private firms (Arup/Parsons 
Brinkerhoff 2010) yielded what the author believes to be a portrait of the 
paradigm currently the result of traditional deliverance on the wide range of sizes 
and complexities of construction projects.  As projects become larger in terms of 
dollar expenditures and more complex by nature of the larger scope the ability of 
a public agency to effectively manage the process while constraining the cost of 
construction diminishes. This is clearly shown in  Figure 3 Caltrans % of Cost 
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Overrun Profile v. Size of Project that details the range of projects that Caltrans 
has taken on and the cost containment effectiveness or lack thereof.  The picture 
could not be clearer in terms of framing the problem. Hence, the “whys” are 
essentially known concerning the dilemma of large projects over-running budget 
to an unacceptable level, thus the focus on large projects as a first hurdle to 
consideration. 
 
As PPP projects begin to grow as a percentage of the total make-up of the 
infrastructure put in place, a broader understanding of the why they work as a 
means of effective cost control is important to understand.  Best practices that are 
essentially under development can be guided by this sharper perspective of why 
they work (Sharma 2010).  
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CHAPTER 3 Methodology 
 
In posing the query as to why a PPP should be able to contain the construction 
phase cost more effectively than other methods of project delivery several key 
aspects must be considered.  The first is what do we already know and second a 
close examination of a current PPP effort.  The context of these two aspects needs 
to be focused in such a way that the confounding dimensions of divergent 
comparative project types do not cloud the observations.  For example if the 
results of school construction program that included a DBB delivery were 
compared to a highway – the results would be subject to criticism due to the 
inherent differences between the types of construction.  A focus on highways will 
provide that focused basis for analysis.   
 
The methodologies supporting the results of this study are two-fold.  First a 
literature review has been conducted that included a wide spectrum of global 
geography.  The various studies and reports were scanned to compile a 
comprehensive view as to the whys of PPP effectiveness.  Public and Private 
entities experiences and reports are all in consideration.  Having done this and 
concluding that there has not been any examination of this aspect the second step 
is through an examination of a very unusual PPP as a Case Study. The Presidio 
Parkway is worthy of examination now as it is being constructed and will likely 
provide additional insights in the future as the work nears completion. It has 
already withstood the rigor of the Value for Money (VfM) phase and is entering 
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the construction phase.  A first phase of the project having been built under a 
DBB methodology should provide a remarkable comparison. The Author 
participated in the development of the VfM study and has additionally been 
involved in various aspects of the procurement and on-going construction phase 
monitoring.  The project has been split in two roughly equal halves. The first 
being a DBB delivery and the second half is being performed as a PPP.  A most 
unique case. 
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CHAPTER 4 Presidio Parkway case study 
 
The central hypothesis of this study is that the PPP contractual framework 
accommodates a more candid and open set of communicative opportunities. In 
short, many of the arguments that may be had later in the constructive process are 
brought forward in a virtual sense and quicker resolutions are imagined and acted 
upon without the added complexity of constructive time and cost pressures.  The 
pressures of getting the CA finalized and into the construction phase are no less 
difficult but the rigor brought to bear in anticipating the effects from causes that 
can be imagined is a key differentiator between PPP and DBB in terms of 
outcomes.  These early phase communications are done with a degree of rigor that 
is not available or valued within the DBB means of delivery (Ahadzi and Bowles 
2004). 
 
The central issues under examination are- 
• Negotiation through contractual empowerment-a comparison of DBB and 
PPP via sample agreements and specifications and the operative words 
therein. 
• Risk allocation-how does it differ between DBB and PPP. 
• Time spent during procurement including outside consultants for issues 
around insurance, legal, financial and technical aspects of the project. 
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A PPP can be examined in terms of its organization and contractual framework 
when compared to the organization and contractual framework of a DBB. DB’s 
are not contrasted as the PPP almost without exception embodies a DB as the 
delivery method within the PPP framework. That difference is set aside within 
this study.  The delivery method for the construction phase is a matter of choice 
left to the Concessionaire. And almost without exception the delivery method 
chosen has been DB.  There is an alternative delivery method that embraces the 
Owner performing the design engineering to 100% and proceeding to the Bid 
phase with the low bidder then obligated to arrange financing as well. This is 
sometimes referred to as Design Build Finance (DBF).  But this is not a study of 
the subtypes of deliverance but rather a look at the reasons why a PPP is more 
effective at controlling the cost of construction.  Some authors most notably the 
FHWA consider DB as a part of the PPP spectrum as depicted in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 FHWA PPP Spectrum (Carollo, et al. 2012) 
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 And indeed the choices of delivery method are points along a spectrum. As the 
risk to the Public increases so too does the level of prescriptiveness.  DB lessens 
that prescriptive nature and lets the DB provider have a larger say in the details of 
the work being built.  And the language of the contracts will change to suit that 
condition. 
 
The complimentary contractual language that supports the enhanced 
communication is central to the issue and an examination of the body of contracts 
that define the roles and degrees of freedom to candidly approach substantive 
issues is the focus of this study.  The operative functions of the parties to the 
processes of creating, implementing and operating a Public infrastructure 
construction effort have a direct bearing on the outcomes. These roles are 
examined in this study as well. Those roles are examined in the “Time” issue 
portion of the study. 
 
Much if not all of the data required to understand the issues under examination is 
available in the Public domain.  The processes and timelines to the endeavor and 
the outcomes are also largely public and easily found.  Some of the underlying 
issues are not as easily identified and consequently will be explained based on 
first hand experiences of the author and then used as tools to test the notions 
regarding the efficacy of one delivery system compared to the others.  
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One set of differentiators between DBB and PPP project are the inputs to the 
construction contracts will include the typical language that enables enhanced 
discussions around sensitive areas such as cost and risk.  The advisors and their 
roles in those discussions, including Insurance, Legal, Technical and Financial 
inputs are examined. The ability to influence the ultimate contract for construction 
as well as the creation of incentives to constrain the ultimate costs through the 
construction process is looked at.  This is a very significant feature as studies are 
proving the effectiveness at constraining the cost of construction to budget to very 
high levels of certainty (NAO 2009).  
 
Finally the roles of the respective parties to the construction contracts, Engineers, 
Constructors, Owners, and Concessionaires are examined in the context of the 
differences between the PPP and DBB method of deliverance.  
 
This study does not consider the effects on construction cost containment from 
differences in funding sources, cost of finance or means of payment to the 
Concessionaire. 
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PPP aspects and characteristics 
 
A look at the typical make up of a PPP compared to a DBB is illustrative.  Figure 
10 details the key aspects of the DBB. 
 
 
Figure 10 Aspects and Characteristics of DBB Contracts (Arup 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aspect Characteristics
Design Detailed and 100% complete
Bid selection Multiple bidders competing on 
construction price
Operation and Maintenance By public agency
Funding of project Public finance (bond)
Repayment of project N/A
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Figure 11 provides a glimpse of the aspects central to a PPP in similar format. 
 
Figure 11 Aspects and Characteristics of PPP Contracts (Arup 2012) 
 
The fundamental makeup of a PPP invites more specialized parties and entities to 
the process. Figure 12 details the PPP to a more finite degree. SPV is also 
sometimes referred to as the Project Company as in the organization chart below.  
 
Aspect Characteristics
Design Often incomplete
Bid selection Proposers compete on price, 
design, and operation and 
maintenance plan for best Value 
for Money (VfM)
Operation and Maintenance By private developer
Funding of project Mixture of public (bonds) and
private (debt and equity)
Repayment of project User fee (toll) or Availability 
Payments from the government.
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Figure 12 PPP SPV Detailing Private Side 
 
The added rigor comes principally from the degree of risk assumed by the Private 
Investors and Lenders.  Within those two entities the entire process of 
procurement takes on an added dimension with the three categories of scrutiny 
applied with an increased degree of rigor. 
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Negotiation 
 
Bid delivery type selection is completely dependent upon the contractual 
documents that form the basis of agreements are but one of the aspects, yet they 
are key. As the characteristics are contrasted between DBB and PPP the 
contractual documents are the driving differentiator between the delivery types.  
The usual form of agreement includes a master document that is called by various 
names and for the sake of brevity in this report the term Concession Agreement 
will represent the master document that binds the Public and Private parties 
together. The Concession Agreement (CA) holds the key attributes of the PPP.  It 
is within this document that the outcomes of the work done prior to contract 
award and the start of construction that will most significantly differentiate the 
methods.  The CA defines the latitude allowed by the Public via the 
communicative processes that better establish the scope and breadth of work.  It 
sets the legal framework supported by the appropriate legislative authority to do 
so.  The CA is looked at from the perspective of how it contrasts with the DBB 
governing documents.  Some early lessons learned from the PPP experience have 
demonstrated the need for negotiation as the central tenant of the PPP process 
(Wiss 1997). 
 
A typical set of State Department of Transportation Standard Specifications have 
been chosen as representative of most used in the North American Region. When 
a scan for the word “negotiate” is complete within the text, the word appears zero 
times. The word “must” appears twenty seven times and the word “shall” appears 
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ten thousand four hundred and eighty one times (CALTRANS, Standard 
Specification Department of Transportation 2006).  That is incredible because that 
figure is spread over eight hundred and seventy two pages, which works out to the 
use of the word shall 12 times per standard specification page.  This speaks not 
only to the prescriptive nature of the contractual environment that the typical 
DBB project suffers but more importantly the lack of empowerment that Public 
officials have in terms of communicating with the Constructor on a DBB contract. 
In contrast, a search of the word “negotiate” within one of the first California 
Highway PPP agreements (Presidio Parkway) yields 22 uses of the word. The 
instances are relevant to discussions around utilities, a barrier movement system 
contract transferred from the State to the Concessionaire, fixing a firm price, to 
arrange a Government guaranteed loan, refinancing, and several other similar 
instances. Significantly the price of construction itself is not within the 
negotiation venue as delineated. The word “must” is used thirty six times and the 
word “shall” is used one thousand six hundred and thirty three times 
(CALTRANS 2011).  This shift in language is significant in that there is some 
opening for the Private side to be heard by the Public side as parties to a contract. 
Another PPP agreement, the Port of Miami Tunnel Project, contains the word 
“negotiate” twelve times including in the context of the utilities and geotechnical 
issues as well as the notable establishment of the original agreement in a very 
broad manner.  The word “must” appears fifty five times and the word “shall” 
arises one thousand three hundred and thirty seven times.  This is in comparison 
to the use of the word “negotiate” in the Florida Standard Specification which 
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appears one time, “must” is used four hundred and nine times and “shall” appears 
two thousand two hundred and seventy one times over nine hundred and ninety 
six pages. 
The word negotiate is vital to the outcome of a project during construction due to 
the time that it takes to resolve issues that require negotiation. Researchers have 
found that 80% of the time spent in negotiation is spent arguing (Kennedy and 
McMillian 1987).  Time spent during the construction period is the most costly 
time to delay the entire process.  Negotiation is so vital to the success of a project 
that studies of PPP’s have shown that open/frank communication during the 
negotiations are a key attribute of successful Concessionaires (Ahadzi and Bowles 
2004) or their failure. 
A state of the art DB contract in California yielded the following: “negotiate” is 
found sixteen times, again, principally around changes to the contract and utilities. 
The word “must” is used nineteen times and the word “shall” is used one 
thousand and four times (USDOT 2012).  In Figure 13 this data is tabularized for 
the California comparison.  
 
Figure 13 Comparison of Key Operative Words in DBB v PPP Documents 
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This very small opening to the process in terms of negotiation is fully taken 
advantage of.  The degree of effort expended by the parties to the support of the 
decisions made by Investors and Lenders is significant.  The degree of due 
diligence that is aligned with the various parties to the PPP process and the degree 
of expertise is usually undocumented.  That is the Private side of the process.  
These inputs come from a variety of experts with varying degrees of expertise.  
The knowledge held by the Legal experts used to examine the documents, 
contracts, agreements, and compendium of laws that apply is far superior to that 
applied to simpler and less costly infrastructure projects.  The reviews that PPP 
are subject to from the technical perspective include proposed construction 
agreements in the form of draft contracts, subcontracts, purchase orders and the 
like.  The engineered solutions are investigated and discussed and input is offered 
for better, safer, more constructible and less costly solutions.  The estimates of 
cost and price are reviewed for reasonableness and accuracy. The levels of 
insurance are scrutinized and assessed from the perspective of adequacy of 
coverage and cost. Finally the Lenders and Investors themselves add all of the 
inputs gathered in their own financial models that test the inputs and the degrees 
of sensitivities to assess the level of risk of the particular PPP.  It is within these 
specialists roles and the discussion that are often essentially negotiations that get 
at the most sound responses to the PPP RFP in the form of a proposal that make a 
PPP a best value delivery method in the end.  The discussion and negotiations 
sometimes lead to decisions by the principal parties to an SPV to not submit a 
proposal as the result of a failed negotiation.   
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The process affords additional negotiation within the Public side as well. Figure 
14 details the means by which the Public side brings in additional levels of effort 
to the negotiations whether it is from within or with the assistance of external 
Consultants.   
 
 
Figure 14 PPP Evaluation Organization on Public side (Arup/Parsons 
Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
Public entities that are sponsoring a PPP have additional time to scrutinize the 
RFP and through the VfM process become better acquainted with the particulars 
via negotiation internally and at the end of the procurement process with the 
respondents to the RFP.  This all takes an effort that requires outlays of cost in 
advance of the projects contract beginning.  
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A recent study conducted in Canada found that the costs that are meant to deal 
with negotiation that may normally come later in the DBB project are shifted 
toward the front end of a projects construction phase, i.e. the negotiation phase. 
And that these could amount up to 3.5% of the total capital cost (Canada 2010).  
This same study attributed the higher costs of a PPP to the front end costs of pre-
contract negotiations when compared to DBB.  It is precisely the negotiation 
attribute that deals forthrightly with issues that are usually suppressed by the lack 
of communication in a DBB – spelt negotiation. The issues are pushed later in the 
process, i.e. when construction is occurring and the costs of negotiation are 
exacerbated.   Figure 15 details the flow of a PPP when considering the VfM at 
various points within the PPP front end lifecycle.  
 
 
Figure 15 VfM PPP Progression (Infrastructure Partnerships Austrailia 
2010) 
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By these measures a little bit of negotiation goes a long way toward constraining 
construction cost.  Some of the most recent studies get at this point from another 
angle when the front end planning efforts required for successful construction 
phase work is complete. This work is complementary to the notion that up front 
time spent is worthy of the expenditure including the time required to effectively 
negotiate robust terms and conditions, specific agreements and details that only 
the project under examination can hold as valuable to the parties (Gibson and 
Bosfield 2012). 
 
Another view toward the use of negotiation stems from the process at the 
inception. Whether the project is brought forward as a publically initiated 
endeavor or unsolicited, part of the process taken on by the Private side is 
formation of a team.  This process involves a selection. Self-selection that is, of 
the best qualified combination of participants to satisfy the demands of the 
particular project.  This vetting of team members is done outside of the Public 
purview and is usually very effective toward achieving the goal of winning the 
pursuit. This normally culminates with a pre-qualification review by the Public 
side.  A substantial degree of due diligence is done prior to this Public review that 
involves a number of factors including the capacity of the design Engineering and 
Construction firms to provide the human resources, financial capacity and basic 
technical expertise required.   
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All of this discussion that most often lead to internal of external negotiation result 
in a better understanding of the parameters of the project including the risk 
embodied by the scope or work.  
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Risk 
 
A central part of the procurement process in the PPP environment is a nuanced 
approach to risk allocation.  This presents another opportunity to communicate 
and negotiate.  During the tender phase the Public Owner often affords the 
proposing Private proposers an opportunity to influence the distribution of risk.  
This has been found to ameliorate the risks via the most cost-effective allocation 
of risk to the party best able to manage that set of risks (Palmer 2000).   
 
Risk assessments, risk registers, and the entire subject of risk as a component of 
cost and price is a slow growth measure usually not addressed adequately in the 
vast majority of Public construction projects as a formal endeavor. DBB casts the 
risks very rigidly via the uses of the words “must” and “shall”.  Very large 
constructors involved in PPP campaigns will to varying degrees apply risk 
assessment procedures.  These can be supplemented with Monte Carlo 
simulations and human thought centered assessments. The Fluor Corporation has 
used these techniques extensively for years and as risk manifests itself on the 
Private side it is balanced in a return mode via profit. This fact among other key 
reasons why Fluor pursues the PPP projects is documented very selectively at 
Private Institutional Investor conferences (Public Works Financing 2012). 
 
It is through that process that risks are thought of in a new light (Gibson and 
Bosfield 2012). That includes consideration of asserting an option to return risks 
that are inappropriately allocated to the party least capable of dealing with them.  
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This reallocation is not specifically codified in terms of contractual language yet 
does occur as a result of the vetting and due diligence that results from the 
participation of outside consultants, financiers and risk professionals that are 
drawn into the various stages of procurement. 
 
In a United States Congressional Budget Study released January 2012 the point is 
made that “a Public Private Partnership can reduce the risk borne by the 
government on a project by shifting a substantial portion of that risk from the 
government to the Private entity” (CBO 2012).  Unfortunately the report stops 
short of introducing our elected officials to the concepts of risk identification, risk 
sharing and the consequent explanation of why this is key to the success of PPP 
contracts.  
 
From the Public perspective shifting risk to the Private side is an alluring 
endeavor.  Multitudes of court cases framed principally by the Spearin doctrine 
frustrate that premise (United States v. Spearin 1918).  The DBB method 
embraces the notion of risk transfer to the detriment of the Public purse. The 
rationale of risk allocation is interpreted by the agents to the DBB process via the 
contractual framework and the “musts” in particular the “shalls” completely 
negate any opportunity to negotiate – as that possibility is absent. And it is within 
negotiation that risk is best dealt with. Most risks have a value that can be 
approximated, but that effort takes time.  Done properly the risk allocation is 
recognized early on during the initial procurement decision whether to pursue a 
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DBB or PPP.  This should occur during the Value for Money (VfM) processes 
and VfM has proven to be a very effective means of determining whether the use 
of DBB, DB or PPP bring the most value to the Public (Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 
2010). 
Figure 16 details the components of VfM graphically. 
 
Figure 16 Risk Consideration in VfM DBB v PPP (Carollo, et al. 2012) 
 
When examining the results of early PPP’s that did not use VfM many of the 
pitfalls that a VfM process would have identified could have been avoided 
(Canada 2010). 
 
When using a VfM the component of risk is a central factor in the differentiation 
process (Hodge and Greve 2009).  A Public Sector Comparator (PSC) e.g. a DBB 
compared against a PPP within a VfM.  An accurate assessment of risks as they 
have bearing on the Public sector then is a key driver in not only the selection of a 
PPP but just as importantly to begin the process of identifying risks that would 
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then become a topic for negotiation as the PPP evolves and the Public entity 
engages the Private proposer. There is a significant amount of effort put into an 
assessment of risk although the degree of the significance can vary depending on 
the size, complexity, number of stakeholders, and the level of sophistication of the 
contributors to the process.   
 
In the typical flow of a PPP the Concessionaires are asked to make comments at 
some point about their level of interest, their views on basic issues including the 
timing of the project, the availability of men, materials, machinery and many 
other aspects.  These discussions are held early on in the process affording all 
parties, specifically the Private side, to assess the risks that the project may hold.  
Having this opportunity potentially results in a discussion focused on those risks 
and how they may be best mitigated and by whom. 
 
As the Private side assess its risk profile using various means, the costs of the risk 
are better understood and via negotiation and simple application of reserves of 
money set aside should the risk trigger at the appropriate level of acceptance of 
risk, the negative consequences of ignoring risks is alleviated.   
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Time  
 
Time spent planning is time well spent.  Critics of PPP contend that too much 
time is expended when compared to DBB.  The Congressional Budget Office 
issued a report early in 2012 that suggests that PPP take longer than DBB from 
inception to start of construction.  Though difficult to quantify this is an endeavor 
that is well documented to the contrary.  When time is examined in the larger 
frame of reference that encompasses the entire process, considers the value at the 
conclusion of the design, build, finance and put into use aspects PPP’s do not 
cause delay. Studies are revealing that the time it takes to bring a PPP to fruition 
can be lengthy. But that there are substantial positive outcomes given that the time 
is spent focusing on the right aspects of the project. The Australians have been 
viewing the entirety of the process and break the lifecycle of the front end work 
into three stages (Infrastructure Partnerships Austrailia 2010).  Causes of the 
length of time it may take to get a PPP advanced are offered including “PPP 
projects are subjected to additional scrutiny and interaction with governments and 
instrumentalities”.  Instrumentalities herein are interpreted to mean the degree of 
scrutiny that is undertaken during due diligence.   
 
The due diligence that occurs is largely if not completely out of sight of the Public 
side of the PPP process.  The results of that due diligence are often utilized during 
the subsequent and consequent negotiation.  And it is the application of legal, 
financial, insurance and technical review that reveal much of the more difficult to 
cast risks and assure that the risks are ultimately allocated in a way that best 
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serves the Public.  The authors experience in dealing with teams that comprise the 
four outside consultants to the process is that this vetting process requires 
sufficient time for the key aspects to be considered by all parties in a way that the 
topics are segregated and ultimately are handed to the team best suited to analyze 
and report back the findings. The goal is to satisfy the RFP in a timely manner 
and return those unresolved issues that cannot reasonably be dealt with on the 
Private side to the Public entity. This effort is generally coordinated on the Private 
side by the Concessionaire.  The unwritten best practices call for a rather frank set 
of negotiations to occur between the parties. These are usually outside experts that 
weigh in on what has been formed as solutions, postures, and proposed 
contractual language that sets the risk allocations.  As these issues come into 
focus on the Private side the technical aspects are normally digested and disposed 
of via specification or plans centric visible solutions. On occasion the solutions 
are found within a means and methods approach by the DB component.  Still 
others must be dealt with via legal language to satisfy a clear approach to avoid 
contractually ambiguous terms.  The financial issues usually revolve around the 
balance of risk return – revenue cash flow considerations and rarely hinge on 
technical matters.  Technical matters and legal matters must be resolved such that 
ultimately the only aspects of the risks inherent in the work that cannot be 
mitigated with more money, time or other resource based solutions must come 
from a risk sharing pool commonly referred to as insurance.  It then becomes the 
insurer’s role to fully understand those parts of the work where risk may manifest 
itself to the detriment of the Private or Public party to the agreement.  These 
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discussions held out of sight of the Public view are central to the success of PPPs 
in terms of total cost and total time to deliver.  A look toward the conclusions and 
recommendations of the most recent studies are trending toward a recognition that 
the time it takes to deal with the issues upfront opposed to during the construction 
phase are quite clear across the globe (Growth Solutions Group 2004).  One of the 
key aspects for example that many reports detail is the need for environmental 
issues including embracing the governmental agencies that administer 
environmental issues to be dealt with early on by the Public side. These issues can 
at times totally confound the progress of a project and the Private providers of 
service are usually ill equipped to deal with the third party stakeholders that have 
a say in the outcomes of projects.  These issues usually boil down to a very few 
choice words in the contractual settings.  
 
The outcome of the Presidio Parkway is coming into view and will be examined 
in this study as a case study.  The lack of understanding likely stems from a lack 
of experience or worse likely due to an inaccurate view of the PPP as something 
novel.  Their use is not novel at all and many studies and reports point this out in 
terms of the historical ways PPP have been used as toll roads and other “Private” 
endeavors granted under charters and the like for the benefit of the infrastructure 
using Public.  
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Case Study- Presidio Parkway 
 
Figure 17 Aerial Rendering of Presidio Parkway DBB-PPP Project shows a 
visualization of the completed project. 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Aerial Rendering of Presidio Parkway DBB-PPP Project 
(Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
Background  
 
The Presidio Parkway began its life with a different name in a different era. The 
project was constructed between 1933 and 1936 in conjunction with the Golden 
Gate Bridge.  The roads and bridges that comprise the southern approach to the 
Golden Gate Bridge were formerly known as Doyle Drive.  The photo in Figure 
18 is reflective of the times and vehicles the roadway was constructed to 
accommodate.  
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Figure 18 Presidio Parkway then known as Doyle Drive late 1930's 
(Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
 The project was named after Frank P Doyle who was a roadway advocate by 
virtue of his Directorship of the California State Automobile Association, a civic 
leader and the first private citizen to cross the Golden Gate Bridge.  The road was 
originally designed for a total of six ten foot wide lanes, three in each direction. 
At that time the roads and bridge were administered by the Golden Gate Bridge 
and Highway District.  In 1945 the road was taken over by the California Division 
of Highways now known as Caltrans. The project was originally designed to 
accommodate the Presidio Military Base which neither resulted in aesthetics not 
being a priority nor was making it easy to enter the Base.  The road effectively 
severed the connection as direct access between the Base and the San Francisco 
Bay. The project was under scrutiny by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
by 1991 and a task force was established to examine design options that were 
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subsequently approved by the new operator of the Presidio, the National Park 
Service.  The Park Service assumed control of the Presidio when it was 
decommissioned as a military base.  There were a number of features of the 
project as envisioned that focused on the historic values, noise and pollution 
impacts, as well as traffic circulation. The project was further studied by the San 
Francisco County Transportation Authority (TA) in 1996 and suggestions 
included multi-modal uses of the facility. A five year long environmental impact 
assessment began in 2000 and a Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report 
was certified in 2008.  
As the gateway to the Golden Gate Bridge the Presidio Parkway is part of a vital 
transportation link because it serves 120,000 vehicles per day carrying some 
140,000 plus daily commuters.  Figure 19 details the setting of the roadway.   
 
Figure 19 Presidio Parkway Location Map (Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
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Significant employers such as Lucasfilm and Letterman Digital Arts as well as 
many other North Bay area businesses are served by the roadway.  The project is 
structurally deficient and 80% of the structures cannot be retrofit and must be 
replaced.  The roadway has a poor traffic safety record due to the 10 foot lane 
widths, no median barrier and an absence of shoulders.  The project is situated 
adjacent to what is now the largest urban national park that attracts approximately 
5 million domestic and international visitors while the Golden Gate itself attracts 
3 million visitors per year.   
 
The project was extensively discussed and viewed by the public stakeholders over 
two hundred plus community meetings.  The project was enhanced via the inputs 
of a Landscape Architect by incorporating cut and cover tunnels as opposed to 
bridges on a portion of the roadway.    The design enhancement affords a context 
sensitive setting with a continuous connection between the Presidio Park and the 
San Francisco Bay waterfront and more attractive sightlines. The project was 
placed in a priority category as well due to the bridge structures vulnerability to 
failure during a large earthquake and was started under a multi-governmental 
entity headed by Caltrans and the SFTA and procured via traditional DBB 
procurement methods.  The project was programmed to be split into eight 
contracts: 
Contract 1: Advanced environmental mitigation (wetland, biological, tree 
removal).  Including mitigation prior to construction activities.  With 
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environmental mitigation during construction accounted for in the individual 
contract budgets’. 
Contract 2: Utility relocation prior to construction activity, including private 
utility relocation for items owned by the Presidio. 
Contract 3: Ruckman Road, Southern Presidio Parkway Interchange, South 
Bound High Viaduct. 
Contract 4: South Bound battery tunnel, at-grade detour, retaining wall number 
six, permanent southbound roadway sections, long weekend closures, partial 
demo of low viaduct structures and the traffic shift effecting an at-grade detour to 
public traffic. 
Contract 5: Girard Under Crossing, main post tunnels, new low viaduct, including 
fill over tunnels, electrical and mechanical substations, demo existing low 
viaduct, maintain and remove at-grade detour, and opening permanent roadway to 
public traffic 
Contract 6: North bound battery tunnels and related roadwork, including fills over 
tunnels, and conformance to existing twin high viaduct. 
Contract 7: North bound viaduct, northern park presidio interchange, North 
Bound roadway to Merchant road 
Contract 8: highway planting. 
As the project moved into the first of several contracts the project came under 
scrutiny at the highest levels of California state government during an 
extraordinary session of the California Senate that resulted in PPP enabling 
legislation signed by the Governor in February of 2009.  This legislation created a 
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program to pilot transportation PPP’s in California until 2017.  At that point the 
Presidio Parkway project was renamed from Doyle Drive and the project was split 
in half whereby the second half or contracts 5 through 8 were studied as a PPP 
and compared to 5 through 8 being carried forward as a DBB.  
 
Figure 20 provides a summary of the construction phases after the project was 
split into two phases. 
 
Figure 20 Presidio Parkway Phase 1 & 2 Profiles (Arup 2012) 
 
 Arnold Schwarzenegger was a solid supporter of using PPP to complete the 
project.  And he went so far as to fire California State officials on the California 
Transportation Commission when they voiced opposition to the plan.   
 
Figure 21 shows the projects Sponsors. 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2
Environmental 
Approval
Record of Decision (ROD) approved in December 2008 for 
the entire project
Activities • Environmental mitigation
• Utility relocation
• Southbound High Viaduct
• Southbound Battery Tunnel
• Traffic detour
• Northbound tunnels
• Northbound High Viaduct
• Low Viaduct
• Landscaping
Timeframe June 2009 – August 2011 August 2011 – December 2014
FHWA Initial Cost 
Estimate $379 Million $550 Million
Construction
Traditional Design-Bid-Build Public-Private Partnership (DBFOM)?
O&M Caltrans or P3?
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Figure 21 Presidio Parkway Sponsors (Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
In that context under the direction of the Co-Sponsors Caltrans and The San 
Francisco County Transportation Authority, the Engineering Joint Venture 
between Arup and Parsons Brinkerhoff that had been principally doing the design 
engineering, was requested to perform a VfM investigation.  There were a number 
of issues that prompted the study. Among them is the decade worth of 
negotiations it took to line up the project funding, but worries about mega-
projects in the Bay area going seriously over budget were foremost in decision 
maker’s minds. Due to the beginnings of the 2008 to 2012 recession, there were 
lingering funding uncertainties.  The economy was headed downward and along 
with declining sales tax and gas tax receipts and earmarks that may not come 
through the concern was around whether there would be sufficient cash when the 
construction started.  The final concern was that there was historic evidence that 
FHWA
Land Owners
Co-Sponsors
Funding Partners
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the State underfunds maintenance and that there was a lack of consideration for a 
maintenance plan on the completed facility. 
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VfM 
 
The Value for Money methodology included a Risk adjusted construction cost, 
benchmarked risk premiums extracted from Caltrans project data. Bent Flyvbjerg 
as well as Florida on I-595 near Ft Lauderdale, FL  An investigation into 
understanding  the optimism bias that plagues early estimates and a look at 
transaction costs in terms of financing factors including senior debt (banks), the 
discount rate, taxation and an net present value (NPV) view were all included.  
 
When conducting a VfM a public sector comparator is matched against a 
presumed set of figures for a PPP.  In this case Caltrans had conducted a standard 
highway department estimate of cost.  These standard estimates are derived from 
historical bidding result data previously received from DBB projects and utilizing 
unit price style data.  In order to right size the estimate a number of adjustments 
were made that allowed the differences in delivery method to be ascertained and 
the ability of a DBB project to overrun was considered.  When examining the 
record at Caltrans the historic data was analyzed and yielded a graph that is 
indicative of the main problematic issue with the large complex project.  The fact 
that historically, the worst overruns of construction containment occur on projects 
over $300 million and the range of that size of projects’ overrun was revealed.  A 
consideration of Optimism Bias as defined by Flyvbjerg was ascertained and that 
led to an understanding of the risks that were embodied in the two types of 
delivery methods under study DBB v PPP.   Estimates were created that captured 
the difference and that calculated difference was included on each side of the 
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comparison.  Without consideration of the risks that the Owners hold the picture 
looks like Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22 Presidio Parkway DBB v PPP without  Risk  Considered 
(Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
With the risks included, the picture looks different as portrayed in Figure 23.   
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Figure 23 Presidio Parkway DBB v PPP with Risk Considered 
(Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff 2010) 
 
The two figures referenced above include a number of considerations that are 
differentiators and were monetized to reflect those differences.  The net calculated 
savings to the project cost including considerations of overrun costs, operation 
and maintenance was $147 million when using a PPP.  The PPP cost was 
calculated to be $488 million compared to $635 for the DBB method.  These 
amounts were inclusive of not only the lower risk adjustment but oversight costs 
that were valued $93 million less using the PPP than the DBB.   Additionally due 
to a more efficient preventative maintenance asset management program during 
operations related to maintenance and rehabilitation costs with an NPV savings -
$6 million but is offset by a lack of economies of scale and higher operating costs 
NPV of +$6 million. Finally the NPV impact of spreading the financing over the 
30 year operations phase of the concession at a lower (after tax) cost of capital 
than the discount rate -$54 million.  In total then the  differential in the risk-
adjusted construction cost in the traditional DBB delivery model and the PPP 
delivery model (NPV $93 million) is the largest contributor to the difference 
between the total NPV of the traditional and P3 delivery options, followed by 
reduced finance costs (NPV $54 million).   
When looking at a Comparison of Phase 2 PPP Construction Costs versus 
Project’s Conventional Phase 1 Costs the VfM determined that Phase 2 has nearly 
twice the amount of physical works yet will deliver that for about the same cost.   
These figures were then put into a cash flow model that compares the two 
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delivery methods and considering nominal cash flows.  The key takeaway was 
that the DBB has an overall lower cost in nominal dollars, but construction is paid 
for up front.  Figure 24 details the profile of nominal cash-flows projected to 33 
year term of the concession and assumes no financing of construction payment at 
$458 million construction completion cost and $128 million in Operation & 
Maintenance expenditures,  
 
 
Figure 24 Presidio Parkway SPV Payback Cashflow (Arup/Parsons 
Brinkerhoff 2010) 
  
When examining the PPP in terms of nominal cash flows the majority of 
payments, through availability payments, defer costs to the public sector until a 
later date. The milestone payment is only made at substantial completion 
certification. A profile of nominal cash-flows projected to the 33 year term of the 
concession yields that during construction for oversight, transaction and retained 
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risk costs the project suffers $72 million. When a milestone Payment of $150M at 
the end of construction is factored in and availability payments starting at $35M 
in 2013 and reaching $40M by 2043, are considered a different perspective begins 
to take shape.  Adding in the Operations & Maintenance component of the 
availability payments that is assumed to escalate with inflation, whereas the 
capital component is assumed to be “flat”, the sum total equals $1.378 billion.  
This is detailed in   . 
 
 
Figure 25 Presidio Parkway SPV Availability Payment (Arup/Parsons 
Brinkerhoff 2010) 
These sum project total costs divided by the lane miles to be constructed were 
compared to a statewide cost of $240 thousand per lane mile per year.  A closer 
look for comparative purposes is viewed in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 Comparison of Phase 2 PPP Construction Costs v Phase 1 DBB 
Construction Costs (Arup 2012) 
 
Upon conclusion of the VfM study the report was sent to Public Infrastructure 
Advisory Commission who reviewed the study approved it and sent it on 
inclusive of a recommendation to affect the PPP to the California Transportation 
Commission.   The Executive Director of the SFCTA stated “Our analysis shows 
that a P3 application is not only feasible, but presents a great opportunity to 
achieve best value for money, deliver the project on schedule, and lower life cycle 
costs [more] than any of the alternatives”  
The DBB procurement milestones were slated as delineated in Figure 27. 
 
Comparison of Phase 2 P3 Construction Costs versus 
Project’s Conventional Phase 1 Costs
Total 
constr. 
cost = 
$370M
Total 
constr. 
cost = 
$384M 
(est.) 
• ~1/3 of the works
• One tunnel, one 
viaduct, half an 
interchange
• Relatively more 
utility relocations
 ~2/3 of the works
 Three tunnels, 
three viaducts, one 
and a half 
interchanges
 Relatively fewer 
utility relocations
PHASE ONE PHASE TWO
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Figure 27 Pre-PPP Procurement Milestones (Arup 2012) 
  
As the project was recast for a PPP delivery the milestones were altered as shown 
in Figure 28.   
 
 
Figure 28 Phase 2 Procurement Milestones (Arup 2012) 
The procurement had numerous objectives. Chief among them was:  
• Environmental Record of Decision signed
• FHWA Initial Funding Plan released
• Contract 1 awarded
• Contract 2 awarded
• Contract 3 awarded
• RFP released
Dec
2008  
Jun
2009 
Dec
2009  
Jun
2010 
• CA P3 Legislation Effective Date (SBx2 4) 
• Technical Bid submission
• Start of PIAC and CA Legislature Review
• Public Hearing
• Financial Bid submission
• Base Rate pricing by Bidders
3
Sept 2010 
10 17 24 1 8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 322 10 17 24 31 6
Oct 2010 Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 
• Notice of Intent to Award Issued
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1. To attain schedule and cost certainty through a robust and proven risk-
sharing P3 contract.  
2. Use public funds more efficiently by eliminating cash-flow risks by 
support of construction in a timely manner.  
3. minimize lifecycle cost by ensuring that Operations & Maintenance costs 
is fully funded and that a dedicated Operations & Maintenance staff is in 
place for 30 years  
4. Create a competitive process that maintains competitive tension.  All of 
these goals were intended to optimize overall project value from a public 
perspective.  The procurement documentation consisted of a Request for 
Proposals (RFP) consisting of Instructions to Proposers (ITP), a Public-
Private Partnership Agreement (PPP Agreement), a Technical 
Requirements and an Evaluation Manual that was also used to assist in the 
scoring of the Technical and Financial Proposals.  An Evaluation Team 
was established that was comprised of a Project Selection Committee 
(“PSC”) as shown in Figure 29.  
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Figure 29 Public side Evaluation Team Structure (Arup 2012) 
 
Their role was to evaluate proposals in accordance with the criteria and 
procedures established by the RFP and Evaluation Manual and to develop and 
approve clarification questions for Proposers as well as to score proposals based 
on their evaluation and input from Financial Proposal Evaluation Subcommittee 
(FPES) and the Technical Proposal Evaluation Subcommittee (TPES). The team 
was also obligated to review individual proposals and assist the Project Selection 
Committee during the evaluation process.  That process included a completed 
Qualitative Rating Form as a consensus for each Proposal and subsequent 
submittal to the PSC as a recommendation.  Additionally the role included 
development of clarification questions for recommendation to the PSC.  There 
was a role for Facilitators that could assist the PSC and FPES by offering 
comments on the technical, financial, and legal aspects of each Proposal.  
Facilitators were restricted and not allowed to provide qualitative ratings or 
Facilitators FacilitatorsFacilitators
Technical Proposal 
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scoring recommendations.  The RFP resulted in three shortlisted proposers.  They 
were:    
o Golden Gate Access Group 
o Golden Link Concessionaire (GLC) 
o Royal Presidio SF Partners 
The preferred proposer was GLC; their organization is detailed in Figure 30. 
 
The Maximum Availability Payment (MAP) came in almost 20% below the CTC 
set affordability limit. Construction costs were $254 million and the Proposal 
included a financing solution utilizes Private Activity Bonds of $150 million, 
TIFIA loans of $150 million and equity of $45 million. The proposer had a typical 
set up used in North America as portrayed in Figure 30. This chart details the 
makeup of the SPV and the Design/Build joint venture split. 
 
Figure 30 Presidio Parkway SPV Organization detailing Participants (Arup 
2012) 
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The Phase 2 start was delayed by two primary factors, litigation and the delay in 
completion of phase 1.  The lawsuit was brought forward by the Public Engineers 
in California Government (PECG) with a challenge to the merit of the project 
proceeding under the Senate Bill that enabled the legislation.  The issue was 
whether a PPP could draw it’s repayment from availability payments instead of 
tolls – in other words the contention that PECG put to the Courts to test is that the 
project must be “self-funding” as with a tolling regime.  The lawsuit failed at the 
District Court level and the appeals were rejected at both the Appeals Court level 
and at the California Supreme Court.  PECG has mistakenly asserted that PPP’s 
are anti-union and anti-public engineer.  That is not the case. And it is also not the 
case that every project can be turned into a PPP.  Less than 10% of all projects are 
suitable for PPP.  This last fact is highly speculative in nature.  A project fits the 
PPP VfM test as a result of its primary characteristic of large price tag (unusual 
size) and degree of complexity.   The degree of impact from the litigation is 
portrayed in Figure 31.  
 
 
Figure 31 Post PPP Procurement Milestones (Arup 2012) 
 
IPDC
TIFIA Negotiations
Litigation Delay
• Award and Execute P3 Agreement
• TIFIA Presentation by GLC
Jan
2011 
Jul
2011 
Jan
2012 
Jun
2012 
Dec
2012  
• Construction 
Begins (est.)
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The project then took the more normal course of progress by the securing of 
finance from a combination of Government backed loans from TIFIA and Private 
finance via a transparent method of securing finance from Private markets. A 
view toward the complete financing picture is found in Figure 32.  
 
 
Figure 32 Project Funding Procured by Sponsors (Arup 2012) 
  
The project was delayed further by the ongoing delays in completing phase 1.  
One fascinating feature of the delays were that out of a list of 10 key risks 
virtually every one of them was triggered and the outcomes in terms of delays and 
costs manifested themselves.  These delays and costs that were identified could 
have been mitigated more effectively with less cost and without the delays had 
they not been essentially ignored by the team principally responsible for 
managing the phase 1 contracts.  
Source1
Controlling 
Agency
State Use
($YOE)
Authority Use 
($YOE)
Total Amount 
($YOE)
Programmed RIP 
(San Francisco)2
Authority, 
CTC $54,000,000 $ - $54,000,000
Future RIP (San 
Francisco)2
Authority, 
CTC $13,000,000 $ - $13,000,000
SLPP Authority, CTC $19,360,000 $ - $19,360,000
MTC STP/CMAQ 
Advance MTC $34,000,000 $ - $34,000,000
Prop K Authority $21,180,000 $14,780,000 $35,960,000
GGBHTD GGBHTD $75,000,000 $ - $75,000,000
Programmed RIP 
(Marin) TAM, CTC $4,000,000 $ - $4,000,000
Programmed RIP 
(Sonoma County) SCTA, CTC $1,000,000 $ - $1,000,000
TOTAL AMOUNT $221,540,000 $14,780,000 $236,320,000
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The most significant outcome to date of the transition from a DBB to a PPP is 
shown in Figure 33. 
 
 
Figure 33 Phase 1 Overrun 1st Quarter 2012 (Arup 2012) 
 
This is evidence of the accuracy of the VfM predictions.  The bid received for 
Phase 2 previously and that have been delayed for a considerable length of time 
have been adjusted slightly via the mechanism afforded by the small window of 
negotiation.  If the PPP proves as effective as the past results would indicate the 
PPP outcome result will be far superior to the DBB 
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CHAPTER 5 Study results 
 
The Presidio Parkway as a case study demonstrates several key aspects of why 
PPP works.  The VfM done properly will reveal the key risks of the project, the 
soundness of the ability to pay for the project and provide a clear path forward to 
achieving the ultimate goals of the project. This VfM is the result of Private 
professional unbiased practitioners of the Legal, Technical, and Financial aspects 
of the project.  The people are quite aside from the Public side and bring a 
different perspective.  The constraints that are built in to the everyday practice of 
engineering and construction of highways require some alteration when the 
project reaches a tipping point of size and complexity that warrants additional 
scrutiny and proof testing.  The why of it working boils down to applying the 
knowledge and expertise of persons that have not only “done it before” but have a 
mindset of being able to recognize that there are times that the rules require 
modification to suit the circumstances, having the ability to recognize when a 
change in standard procedure is complimentary to the goals of the project and to 
the benefit of the Public.  In most every PPP there is a set of professionals that 
have the requisite knowledge and skill set to embrace the degree of complexity 
that a project presents.  By maneuvering through the constraints in a way that 
points out where the constraints are indeed not constraining the project progress in 
a positive way but in fact hinder what needs to occur the professionals can work 
with the Public side to craft palatable solutions to problems that would otherwise 
vex a project or worse completely frustrate a project that brings vast benefits to 
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the Public in general.   The focus then is on the Private side’s contribution to the 
process of the PPP.  It is all encompassing. From where the money to fund comes 
from to how it gets spent in the near term of design engineering and construction 
further to the life cycle of the completed works.  The mindset of the Public side of 
the equation has become shortsighted due to the political realities of the election 
cycles and the implications of those cycles.  The impacts of constructing the built 
environment are huge – but just as important are the upkeep of those built 
environments.  This effort of upkeep commonly called Operations and 
Maintenance are not programmed into the mix of costs in most cases.  PPP brings 
in a longer term perspective of caretaking of the built environment.  In that 
examination of the longer term impacts the legal, technical and financial focus 
generates numerous scenarios of good things and bad things that may happen over 
the projects lifecycle.  From strictly an investment point of view – the shrewd 
mentality that a banker may apply countered with what is within the legal bounds 
and technically feasible results in a range of possibilities that a large complex 
project may require to be a long term success.  And it is the very small opening of 
the negotiating door that is in essence more communication about the total set of 
project aspects that lets the best ideas, approaches, means of construction, 
agreement details and means of funding that serve the longer life cycle 
considerations of a project.  The Presidio Parkway is unusual in addition to being 
a large complex project the fact that it began as a conventional DBB that has 
evolved into a PPP will provide an ongoing test case that will allow some 
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conclusive comparisons to the two methods.  Examination by a number of 
constituents to the process will provide a poignant benchmark for future study. 
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CHAPTER 6 Issues for further study 
 
California has created, through legislation, the ability for PPP’s to come to 
fruition. There is much to be learned from this endeavor.  It is clear that the 
success that has been demonstrated by the global experience of PPP to effectively 
constrain construction costs is real.  The ways in which the PPP is made to happen 
can and does vary.  There are several lessons learned from the experience of the 
Presidio Parkway PPP, other PPP’s completed and PPP’s done in places outside 
the US.  These lessons should be compiled and turned into a body of knowledge 
that can be widely disseminated and better understood such that the PPP method 
of delivery may be used where appropriate.  This collection of knowledge should 
be held at the Federal level.  The FHWA has demonstrated an ability to bring 
knowledge skimmed from the states experience. This can be seen when funding 
considerations are undertaken by the FHWA and the most current practices are 
utilized on large DB projects.  In those projects the latest risk assessment 
techniques have been employed to make projections of a projects potential swing 
in cost.  Canada has established Partnerships BC in the province of British 
Columbia to house the collected best practices of performing PPP’s.   There are 
moves underway to internalize some of the global and stateside experiences of the 
PPP method of delivery.  It is a laborious and time consuming process to change 
the status quo.  And that change requires recognition that the PPP method has a 
limited application.  It is not a panacea. It is a step change of improvement to 
project deliverance.  The Transportation Research Board that draws its support 
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from the National Academy of Sciences has begun to fund studies that will bring 
the VfM process to the forefront of the front end planning process when 
considering the appropriate means of delivery for projects.  One of the key 
deliverables from the aforementioned Partnerships BC compendium of knowledge 
is a process flow that considers the specifics of a project under consideration for 
deliverance method.  
 
A key question that is the subject of scrutiny in the literature as delineated above 
is:  Does the method of delivery really matter? Or is the cost of funding the more 
important consideration?  This can be examined by looking at the variability of 
the cost of construction and the variability of finance in a steady state view. When 
comparing the degree of variability of the Presidio Parkway strictly from the risk 
perspective between the DBB and the PPP a difference of $125 million was in 
play. This was the amount that could have been shifted one way to the Public side 
or the other to the Private side.  Experience proves that attempts to achieve this on 
large complex projects via the DBB do not universally work. Accepting that fact, 
is difficult on the part of the Public entities that have felt the sting of these 
overruns.  Both from the personal managerial point of view and the Public’s 
interest projects are not being served as well as possible when viewed at the 
outcome stage.  From the more simplistic financial view of what the DBB versus 
PPP opportunities yield in terms of funding, the picture is similarly clear, but is 
dependent upon the markets variability as well. Since the markets are constantly 
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in flux – then so should the decision making involved.  This can be seen by 
comparing the variability of financing profiles at different rates in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34 Breakeven points of Delivery Types v Discount Rate (Arup 2012) 
 
These are the sorts of considerations that require specialized knowledge and that 
most states do not necessarily hold nor should they be required to hold that 
expertise at all times. And for that reason a national repository of information 
should be held at the federal level that is available to all fifty states and any 
subsidiary form of government that can inform and provide guidance when the 
need arises. 
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The focus of this study has been the why PPP’s can bring a superior cost 
containment to the constructive process in the built environment. And the focal 
point has been highways. Can the method be employed across a wider spectrum 
of the built environment?  The answer is yes and it is already underway both in 
California and other locations. In Canada there is a considerable set of projects 
underway in the field of health care and in the US we have seen the first PPP in 
California in the judicial field with the Long Beach courthouse PPP.  Airports 
have not seen much activity in the way of PPP’s here in the US but have seen 
activity around the globe. The FAA has in essence put into place a PPP for the 
weather information and ground support of aviators in the US. How this effort 
working and what is are the similarities to more capital intensive endeavors?  The 
largest question in terms of impact that has not been answered is: How much 
capital may be freed up by using PPP’s more extensively than we are now in the 
US?  That one question was speculated upon above.  And to further speculate in 
an effort to gauge the impact, a recent report stated that the need for infrastructure 
in the US is on the order of $2 trillion.  So applying the 10% of projects fits and 
10% is saved or freed up for other uses due to efficiency.  That points to a $20 
billion net savings.   This is another area worth investigation. Is there a space for 
PPP’s in US health care, or is our system so different from the Canadian (for 
example) that it does not make sense here?  Can PPP’s assist in lowering the cost 
of healthcare? These issues get into areas that include the questions: How large is 
the market for PPP? What areas of the Public built environment should be 
considering PPP?  What role does government carry out in the PPP process? Is the 
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PPP support system adequate to fulfill its promise should it be more widely 
utilized?  How much does VfM cost? At what point does a VfM need to stop?  
How much time does it take to perform a VfM? Can the VfM be conducted 
concurrently with the advance of a project?  Are VfM’s done better by principally 
Public or Private Parties? Do PPP’s take longer than DBB’s? What are the 
transaction costs?  These are all questions that are worthy of continued and 
advanced study.  Of course the projects that are still in progress like Presidio 
Parkway US 36 near Denver, CO and others in the pipeline warrant further 
examination. These projects are ripe for study in similar form to that completed 
by Chasey, et.al. for the highways PPP in the US.  And certainly a continuation of 
that study as projects complete the PPP cycle through the construction phase need 
to be done.  It is only by examining what works and what does not that the most 
accurate assessments may be made and that the  best outcomes dependent upon 
the method of construction deliverance will yield the best results for the public.  
 
There is one other project delivery method worthy of mention in the context of 
considering best value approaches - Construction Management / General 
Contracting (CM/GC).  This method affords even a higher level of negotiation, 
risk assessment and input to the design process due to the early involvement of 
the Constructor during the design, cost and schedule development stages of the 
work (FHWA 21012).   Early results are promising and the input to this study is 
only to emphasize that more communication via negotiation, risk allocation and 
time spent early in the procurement are all well spent efforts of energy.   
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An interesting aside from the FHWA Office of Innovation cited above, the entity 
poised to gain the most significant set of benefits from PPPs is our Governments 
(we the people) yet these entities are the most pessimistic when casting the results 
of their studies. This is best represented by the recent CBO report – which is 
relying upon outdated data to form conclusions and worse inform our 
congressional representatives on the topic. The CBO is not alone in this 
misrepresentation of the facts and outcomes from PPPs’. The Office of Inspector 
General has not done an adequate job of assessing the pros and cons (Office of the 
Inspector General 2011) and is rather myopic in its view of the experience already 
generated in the larger sphere of PPP uses.   Most recently California has 
committed the same mistake in the Legislative Analyst Office report. This excerpt 
from the report assumes apparently that the DBB method provides equal certainty 
of cost – when it has proven time and time again that it does not.  
“Our analysis indicates that utilizing a different set of assumptions (such as a 
discount rate of 5 percent and excluding the assumed tax adjustment) would result 
in the cost of the Presidio Parkway project being less—by as much as $140 
million in net present value terms—in the long run under a traditional 
procurement approach than the chosen P3 approach.” 
In a recent report published by Stanford University the conclusion regarding the 
VfM is quite different from the LAO’s input.  The more complimentary report 
from Stanford likely stems from a better understanding of the inputs, impact and 
outcomes  (Carollo 2012).  
  78 
WORKS CITED 
Ahadzi, Marcus, and Graeme Bowles. "Public-private partnerships and contract 
negotiations: an empirical study." Construction Management and 
Economics, 22, 2004: 967-978. 
 
Arup. "Public Presentation of Presidio Parkway." 2012. 
 
Arup/Parsons Brinkerhoff. Analysis of Delivery Options for the Presidio Parkway 
Project. 
http://www.presidioparkway.org/project_docs/files/presidio_prkwy_prjct_
bsnss_case.pdf, 2010. 
 
Bain, Robert. "Construction Risk - What Risk?" Project Finance International, 
February 10 , 2010: 46-50. 
 
Beard, J. L., M.C. Loulakis, and E. C. Wundram. Design-Build: A Brief History. 
Design Build Planning Through Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2001. 
 
CALTRANS. "Public Private Partnership Agreement ." Presidio Parkway. State 
of California, January 2011.—. "Standard Specification Department of 
Transportation." State of California, May 2006. 
 
Canada, Conference Board of. Dispelling the Myths A Pan-Canadian 
Assessmenmt of Public Private Partnerships for Infrastructure 
Investments. Ottawa: The Conference Board of Canada, 2010. 
 
Carollo, George, Mike Garvin, Ray Levitt, Ashby Monk, and Andrew South. 
Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Delivery. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University, Collaboratory for Research on Global Projects, 2012. 
 
CBO. Using Public-Private PArtnerships to Carry Out Highway Projects. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2012. 
 
Chasey, A., Maddex, W., Bansal, A. "A Comparison of Public-Private 
Partnerships and Traditional Procurement Methods in North American 
Highway Construction." Transportation Research Record, 2012. 
 
FHWA. "Construction Program Guide." Construction Manager / General 
Contractor Project Delivery. 21012. 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/cqit/cm.cfm (accessed October 31, 
21012). 
  79 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. "Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?" 
Journal of the American Planning Association, Summer 2002: pp. 279-
295. 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent, Mette K. Skamris Holm, and Soren L. Buhl. "How common and 
how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects?" 2003. 71-
88. 
 
Gibson, G Edward, and Roverta Bosfield. "Common Barrier to Effective Front 
End Planning of Capital Projects." Construction Research Congress. 2012. 
2459-2468. 
 
Growth Solutions Group. Review of Partnerships Vitoria Provided Infrastructure 
Final Report to the Treasurer. Melbourne: Growth Solutions Group, 2004. 
 
Hodge, Graeme A., and Carsten Greve. Public Private Partnerships: The Passage 
of Time Permits a Sober Reflection. Oxford, England: Blackwell 
Publishing, Jounal compilation Institute of Economic Affairs, 2009. 
 
Infrastructure Partnerships Austrailia. Performance of PPPs and Traditional 
Procurement in Australia. Sydney: Infrastructure Partnerships Austrailia, 
2010. 
 
Iowa DOT, Standard Specification. "Iowa Department of Transportation." Iowa 
DOT Standard Specification. Ames, Iowa: State of Iowa, 2012. 
 
Kennedy, G, and J. McMillian. Managing Negotiations: How to get a better deal. 
London: Business Books Ltd, 1987. 
 
Morallos, Dorothy, Adjo Amekudzi, Catherine Ross, and Michael Meyer. "Value 
for Money Analysis in U.S. Transportation Public-Private Partnerships." 
Transportation Research Record 2115, 2008: 2115. 
 
Mott McDonald. Review of Large Public Procurement. HM Treasury, 2002. 
NAO, et al. Performance of PFI Construction A Review by the Private Finance 
Practice. Victoria, London: National Audit Office, 2009. 
 
Office of the Inspector General, OIG. Financial Analysis of Transportation-
Related Public Private Partnerships. Report to Federal Highway 
Administrator, Washington, DC: United States of America Department of 
Transpotration, 2011. 
 
Palmer, K. Contract Issues and Financing in PPP/PFI (Do We Need the “F” in 
“DBFO” Projects?). Report prepared for the IPPR Commission on 
Public, London: Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2000. 
  80 
 
Public Works Financing. "Why Fluor Pursues P3s." Public Works Financing, 
October 2012. 
 
Queiroz, Cesar. Public-Private Partnerships in Highways in Transition 
Economies: Recent Experience and Future Prospects. Paper presentation 
at meeting, Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Board 86th 
Annual Meeting, 2007. 
 
Sanvido, Victor Ernest, and Mark D Konschar. Selecting project delivery systems 
: comparing design-build, design-bid-build and construction management 
at risk. Fairfax, PA: The Project Delivery Institute, 1999. 
 
Sharma, Deepak K, Cui Qingbin, Chen Lijian, and Jay K Lindly. "Balancing 
Private and Public Interests in Public-Private Partnership Contracts 
Through Optimization of Equity Capital Structure." Transportation 
Research Record 2151, 2010. 
 
Shrestha, P. P., Migliaccio, C.G.,O'Conner, J.T., Gibson, G.E. "Benchmarking of 
Large Design-Build Highway Projects: One-to-One Comparison and 
Comparison with DBB Projects." Transportation Research Board Annual 
Meeting CD-ROM. Washington, D.C.: TRB, 2006. 
 
Spector, Dina. "Business Insider." Business Insider.com. November 11, 2011. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/infrastructure-urban-land-institute-2011-
10?op=1 (accessed November 15, 2012). 
 
Taylor, Mac. Maximizing State Benefits From Public-Private Partnerships. 
Report to the Legislature, Sacramento: State of California, Legislative 
Analyst Office, 2012. United States v. Spearin. 248 (U.S. 132, 1918). 
 
USDOT, CALTRANS, Port of Long Beach, Metro. "Gerald Desmond Bridge 
Replacement Contract." Design Build Contract-Book One, Contract No. 
HD-7961. Port of Long Beach, 2012. 
 
Warne, Thomas and Associates, LLC. "Design-Build Contracts for Highway 
Projects; A Performance Assessment." 2005. 
 
Wiss, Ronald A, Richard T Roberts, and S. David Phraner. Beyond 
Design=Build-Operate-Maintain Transit Projects. Paper at TRB meeting 
Paper No. 00675, Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Record 
1704, 1997. 
 
Yescombe, E. R. YCL Consulting Ltd., London, U.K. 1997. www.yescombe.com. 
 
  81 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
William E. Maddex brings 35 years of construction experience to the burgeoning 
field of Public Private Partnerships.  Mr. Maddex is employed by Arup, a 
renowned professional engineering services consultancy based in the United 
Kingdom with global reach. Since joining Arup 5 years ago, he has risen to the 
position of Associate Principal and Leader of Cost Engineering Services in the 
Americas. Based in San Francisco, Bill has traveled extensively in the US, 
Canada, Central and South America to provide essential input on over 25 PPP’s 
worth more than $30 billion.  After earning his Bachelor of Science in 
Engineering degree from the Del E Webb School of Construction Management at 
Arizona State University; Bill went to work for a number of notable heavy civil 
and industrial construction firms on a variety of projects throughout North 
America. These projects include airports, tunnels,  highways, bridges, earthfill 
and concrete dams, coal fired, natural gas and hydro spun electric powerplants, 
coal, copper, gold and other types of mining projects, water and wastewater 
treatment plants, environmentally driven industrial cleanups and retrofits and a 
host of other project types too numerous to list. Currently Bill provides valuable 
advice on major projects from New York’s $5 billion Tappan Zee Bridge to San 
Francisco’s $1 billion approach to the Golden Gate, the Presidio Parkway 
(formerly known as Doyle Drive).  Other major California projects, start just 
outside Bill’s office window with his involvement at the Trans-Bay 
Transportation Center in downtown San Francisco and from there encompass the 
breadth of the Golden State via his participation in making the California High 
Speed Rail from Sacramento to San Diego a reality.  Bill holds a Certified 
Estimating Professional credential from AACEI. He regularly guest lectures at the 
University of California at Berkeley and San Jose State University. Bill has 
previously contributed to the widely recognized Recommended Practice on 
“Contingency Determination using Range Estimating” and co-authored the first 
study focused on the efficacy of construction costs when using the PPP method of 
project deliverance. Bill has long been interested in alternative project delivery 
methods and possesses a considerable wealth of experience about Public Private 
Partnerships; a method that he believes holds much promise for the United States 
as we work through these difficult economic times and beyond. 
